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TO COMBAT DEPRESSION
WILFREDOWEN,THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
This report deals with the volume of certain types of self-liquidat-
ing public works that might be undertaken as part of a program
to combat depression, the obstacles that stand in the way of under-
taking such a program, and the actions that need to be initiated now
to minimize these obstacles.
In the strictest sense the term "self-liquidating" might be inter-
preted as meaning those facilities that are financed through revenue
bonds secured by the earnings of the project. But departures from
this strict interpretation will develop as certain variations of the rev-
enue bond and toll-financing approach enter into the discussion; and
consideration of earmarked tax revenues for highway purposes will
add to the scope of projects that may be considered self-supporting.
The discussion will be focused on the toll road as an example of self-
liquidating public works, both because of the magnitude of recent
developments in this area and because of the experience in self-
liquidating public works that such undertakings have provided. Con-
sideration will also be given to certain nontoll highway projects, and
to a growing area of self-supporting facilities that includes truck
and bus terminals, parking facilities, airports, and urban transit. The
report omits many other possible self-liquidating projects, such as
water and sewer facilities, river valley development, power, and irri-
gation.
In general this report discusses the following:
1. The scope of certain public works activities and self-liquidat-
ing projects that appear desirable in and adaptable to a program
designed to combat depression.
2. Specific features peculiar to self-liquidating projects that might
prove to be obstacles in a program designed to combat depression.
3. Steps that might be taken now to improve the potential con-
tribution of self-liquidating public works to an antidepression pro-
gram.
The paper does not presume to resolve questions of countercyclical
Prepared with the assistance of Priscilla St. Denis, research assistant, the BiQQk-
ings Institution.
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effects that might be expected to follow from this particular anti-
depression tool, or to judge what timing and magnitude Of public
works activities would be desirable under the peculiar circumstances
that might accompany various types and degrees of economic de-
pression.
1. Possibilities of Self-Liquidating Public Works
To provide some perspective, it may be noted that during 1953
the total value of new construction in the United States, including
public and private activities, was $35.3 billion (Table 1). Public'
TABLE 1







Total new construction $35,256 100.0%







Public utility 4,416 12.5
All other private 120 .3


























All other public 107 .3
Source; Construction and Building Materials, Dept. of Commerce, June 1954,
p. 17.
works were over $11 billion, or about one-third of the total. Self-
liquidating public works, under any reasonable definition, were a
fairly small part of the public construction total. There were, of
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course, substantial volumes of private construction that might in
depression periods provide opportunities for self-liquidating public
works or for publicly aided private undertakings.
Relating public works to the gross national product (and omit-
ting military expenditures), expenditures have been approximately
2.5 to 8.5 per cent of the total national product in most years since
1930. A high of 4 per cent was reached in 1936, 1938, and 1939;
during the war the figure was naturally below the long-run aver-
age (see Table 2).
A number of recent estimates have been made of the magnitude
of the state and local public works backlog. A figure frequently
cited is $100 billion. Although the accuracy of this figure will not
be defended, its magnitude does reflect both the inability to pro-
vide needed facilities during the war and the rapid expansion of
requirements after the war. Population growth and shifts and ex-
panding industrial plant have created vast new community re-
quirements; and an extended period of prosperity has made the
ability to pay for such facilities an added factor in the size of the
backlog.
Table 3 presents a conservative estimate of state and local con-
struction projects in need of immediate attention. The fact that
the estimate either is conservative or is intended to cover only
high-priority or immediate needs is evident from the fact that
highway construction requirements alone over the next decade and
a half have been estimated by highway agencies at $40. to 55
billion. Here they total only $10.4 billion. The tabulation does indi-
cate, however, that public works projects could provide a large
volume of needed construction activity as a means of counteracting
a decline in economic activity.
The question, then, is what part of the public works require-
ments of the United States can be considered self-liquidating, either
in whole or to any substantial degree; and what specifically are
these projectsthat might serve as a means of stimulating the con-
struction industry in time of depression.
Although the most prominent example of self-liquidating public
works is the toll road, there are a number of other kinds of public
construction that have self-supporting potentials. Some of these
are relatively new postwar developments: union truck terminals,
bus depots, parking garages, airports, and other terminal facilities.
An example of longer standing is the highway financed through
limited-obligation bonds secured by anticipated gasoline tax reve-
259TABLE 2
Public Construction as Related to Gross National Product, 1921—1954
Public Highway and
Construction aStreet Construction .
(millions of
current dollars)
as Per Cent of Total
Public Construction
Public Construction
as Per Cent of GNP
1921 $1,515 56.3% 2.2%
1922 1,659 52.8 2.4
1923 1,606 50.1 2.0
1924 1,892 52.2 2.3
1925 2,130 50.8 2.4
1926 2,133 50.0 2.3
1927 2,397 51.0 2.8
1928 2,470 52.2 2.7
1929 2,467 49.7 2.4
1930 2,829 53.6 3.1
1931 2,619 51.7 3.4
1932 1,828 52.4 3.1
1933 1,612 52.5 2.9
1934 2,264 44.2 3.5
1935 .2,196 38.5 3.0
1936 8,487 89.1 4.2
1937 8,059 40.1 8.4
1938 3)358 42.3 4.0
1939 3,684 37.5 4.1
1940 3,243 40.1 3.2
1941 4,131 25.8 3.2
1942 .5,644 13.0 3.5
1943 3,772 11.8 2.0
1944 2,236 16.2 1.0
1945 1,708 23.3 . .8
1946 2,174 41,2 1.0
1947 3,229 44.9 1.4
1948 4,667 88.0 1.8
1949 6,268 34.0 2.4
1950 6,823 83.3 2.4
1951 8,444 29.8 2.6
1952 9,488 30.3 2.7
1953 10,072 31.4 2.7
1954 10,779 34.8 3.0
aIncludesresidential and nonresidential building, sewer and water, highway,
miscellaneous public service enterprises, conservation and development, and
other (parks and playgrounds, memorials, etc.). Excludes military construction.
Source: Construction and Building Materials, Dept. of Commerce, Statistical
Summary, May 1953; June1954;June 1955.
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flues allocated to that specific purpose. Still other examples of
self-liquidating public works are found in water supply systems,
sewage facilities, and irrigation plants. A few of the newer develop-
ments in self-liquidating public works will be discussed and the
needs and possibilities described before turning to the problems
that a self-liquidating construction program might be expected to
encounter in any large-scale compensatory spending effort.
TABLE 3
Immediate Construction Backlog, State and Local
Government, 31, 1954
Backlog





Streets and roads 8,026 11
Public buildings 14,801 19
Industrial buildings 10,868 14
Commercial buildings 11,745 16
Unclassified 14,661 19
All classes $75,712 100%
Source: Construction and Building Materials, Dept. of Commerce, Ju'y 1954.
HIGHWAYS
Unfortunately for policies to combat depression, the urgency of
programs to reduce postwar congestion have made it impossible to
postpone traffic relief, and as a result the extraordinary highway
construction work of recent years has coincided with the highest
levels of economic activity.
Highway expenditures in 1954 reached a total of approximately
$6 billion, of which about $8.7 billion was new construction. Table 2
shows the trend in highway construction outlays in relation to total
civil public works expenditures, in current dollars. About 81 per
cent of the total civil public works outlays in 1953 were for highways,
but in the depression period the proportion was as high as 50 to 54
per cent.
Highways are financed largely by road-user payments, which
now amount to about $3.2 billion per year (Table 4). Although user
payments cover somewhat less than 60 per cent of the total sum
spent for highway (maintenance and new construction) in the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of current revenue outside of federal aid for main state highway
work.'
Although most of the borrowing for nontoll highway construc-
lion has in the past been through general-obligation bonds, any
program of self-liquidating public works could take advantage of
the peculiar nature of highway revenues and their ability to finance
revenue bonds or limited-obligation bonds. In most states motor
vehicle registration fees and gasoline taxes are considered user
charges rather than general taxes and are allocated specifically to
highway purposes. In half the states the application of such funds
for highway purposes is guaranteed by amendments to state consti-
tutions prohibiting any other use. These revenues proved to be
highly stable even during the last depression, when, for example, a
reduction in automobile production to 25percent of the 1929
level was accompanied by a slight increase in automobile use and
therefore in the productivity of gasoline taxes and other user
charges. In a future depression this source of revenue for highways
could be expected to remain at fairly high levels, but total funds
available for road work would be reduced by property tax delin-
quencies.
Borrowing for highways by the states and by toll road authorities
has in recent years been primarily in the form of limited-obligation
bonds, secured by highway-user taxes, and in the form of toll-
secured revenue bonds. Bonds outstanding at the end of 1951 totaled
$2.4 billion, which compares with $1.6 billion in 1945 (see Table
5). The general-obligation bonds will also, for the most part, be
paid out of highway "earnings" in the form of user tax revenues.
TABLE 5




Toll revenue bonds 871,885
Reimbursement obligations 51,989
Total $2,446,263
Source: Hugo C. Duzan, William R. McCallum, and Thomas R. Todd, "High-
way Bond Financing," Public Roads, October 1952, p. 73.
An example of the type of bond financing on recent expressway
projects, combining methods of self-support with general tax sup-
2.Localroads and streets, on the other hand, derive principal support from prop-
erty taxes and general tax revenues.
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port, is provided by a recent Michigan financing plan. Detroit's
$180 million Edsel Ford and John Lodge expressway program is .be-
ing financed jointly by the state, county, city, and federal govern-
ments. A law passed by the 1950 special session of the state legis-
lature permitted financing through revenue bonds which will be
retired by the weight and gasoline tax collections. A state-county-
city agreement was signed for sharing the cost of the debt and to
take advantage of the amendment to the Federal Aid Highway Act
which provides that federal aid appropriations can be used to help
retire bonds for toll-free highway projects on the primary
system. The agreement pledges $1,125,000 annually from both the
city and county, and $2,500,000 from the state highway department.
A total of $80 million in twenty-five-year bonds were sold at an
average of 2.12 per cent interest rate.
In Florida a $224 million Miami expressway program will make
use of a variety of financial devices, including a combination of
tolls and taxes. The financing plan includes a 10 cent bridge toll,
a special downtown district benefit tax, the county's share of the
state 7 cent gasoline tax, a special 1 cent county gasoline tax, and a
special motor vehicle license fee for the county.
A relatively new example of a self-supporting road and bridge
program which makes use of the limited obligation bond is to be
found in Pennsylvania. In 1949 the General Assembly passed the
State Highway and Bridge Authority. Act, which provides for the
issuance of revenue bonds secured by highway-user revenues. Under
the terms of this law, the Authority may issue thirty-year bonds at
interest rates not exceeding 4 per cent and use the proceeds to build
highways which when completed are leased to the state. The bonds
are paid with the proceeds of the rental. This arrangement is based
on cooperation between the State Highway Department and the
Authority. All plans and specffications must be approved by the
Department of Highways, and the Authority is empowered to lease
property to the State Highway Department for a ninety-nine-year
period. Interchangeability of employees, equipment, and services is
provided for. The borrowing power of the Pennsylvania Authority,
however, is limited to $40 million.
Although this special authority affords a means of circumventing
constitutional debt limits, it is limited as a means of overcoming
restrictions on large-scale borrowing, because it does not remove
the problem of obtaining sufficient current revenues to service the
debt. As demonstrated by the experience in New Jersey, Maine,
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and other states that have adopted toll-road financing, available
funds from current taxes are not sufficient to pay the service charges
on any substantial amounts of new debt because tax rates have
not kept pace with construction costs and existing laws governing
the distribution of user revenues do not permit concentration of
available revenues on major arteries. Consequently the type of
special public works authority operating in Pennsylvania does not
appear to offer a real alternative to the toll road.
TOLL HIGHWAYS
Increasing acceptance is now indicated for toll finance as a means
of raising the necessary capital for high-cost highways and avoiding
the obstacles of debt limits, inadequate current revenues, and other
legal obstacles to highway modernization. The facts, as of late 1953,
were as follows:
1. A total of 734 miles of toll roads had been constructed in 9
states at a cost of approximately $651 million.
2. Another 1,102 miles of toll roads were under construction in 8
states involving an estimated cost of $1.4 billion.
3. A further 1,716 miles had been authorized involving an esti-
mated expenditure of $2.2 bil]ion.
4. Some 706 miles involving an estimated cost of $674 million
were in the planning stage (Table 6).
TABLE 6
Mileage and Cost of Toll Roads Completed, under Construction,




• Completed and in operation
Colorado: Denver Boulder Turnpike 17.3 $6,366
Connecticut: Merritt and Wilbur Cross Parkways b 67.0 38,092
Florida: Buccaneer Trail 15.0 4,600
Maine: Turnpike 47.2 20,600
New Hampshire: Turnpike 14.7 6,770
New jersey: Turnpike 117.6 280,000
New York: Hutchinson River and Saw Mill River Park-
ways b 39.5 •14,000
Oklahoma: Turnpike 88.0 38,793
Pennsylvania: Turnpike System 327.2 241,664
Total 733.5






Florida: Jacksonville, expressway system 41.0$69,000
Maine: Turnpike extensions 60.0 55,000
New Hampshire: Turnpike extensions 40.0 36,500
New Jersey: Garden State Parkway (1 165.0 285,000
New York: Thruway 427.0 500,000
Captree Parkway 7.0 7,300
Ohio: Turnpike 241.4 326,000
Pennsylvania: Turnpike extensions 33.0 65,000
West Virginia: Turnpike 87.6 96,000
Total 1,102.0$1,439,800
Pro fectsauthorizedbut not financed
Connecticut: New York line to Rhode Island line 125.0$213,000
Florida: Stuart to Miami Turnpike 110.0 96,000
Indiana: Turnpike 150.0 193,000
Massachusetts: Cross-State Turnpike 180.0 200,000
New Jersey: Turnpike extensions 92.0 483,000
New York: Thruway extensions 108.0 150,000
North Carolina: Gastonia—Mt. Airy Turnpike 125.0 200,000
Pennsylvania: Turnpike extensions 280.0 240,000
Texas: Dallas to Fort Worth 83.0 31,000
Dallas—Fort Worth area to San Antonio 276.0 150,000
Wisconsin: Cross-state toll road 287.0 200,000
Total 1,716.0$2,156,000
Proposed
Georgia: Florida line to St. Marys and beyond 50.0$20,000
Kansas: Kansas City to Wichita via Topeka 210.0 105,000
Kentucky: Louisville to Elizabethtown - 40.0 22,000
Ohio: Cincinnati to N.E. border of state 300.0 400,000
Virginia: Richmond to Petersburg 36.0 57,000
Washington: Tacoma to Everett 70.0 70,000
Total 706.0.$674,000
Grand Total 4,257.5$4,920,685
aWhereactual costs are not yet available, bond sales or estimated costs are
shown.
b Built as free roads.
Although tolls will be collected only on two bridges, the project is classified
as a toll road because of the co-mingling of toll and other revenues for debt serv-
ice, operation, and maintenance of the entire system.
d Total parkway length is 180 miles; 15 miles of free-road links built by High-
way Department.
Includes only projects currently under consideration for which mileage and
costs have been estimated by state or in published releases. Projects for
which mileage and costs are not known have been authorized or are being studied
in Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, among others.
Source: Bureau of Public Roads.
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There is the possibility, therefore, that 4,258 miles of toll roads
at a cost of $4,920.7 million may be operating in the United States
on principal intercity routes within the next few years. Additional
toll-road construction might be undertaken in states which have
general authorization to provide toll roads but have taken no steps
to designate specific routes. Altogether, 34 states have given con-
sideration to toll-road legislation and 23 have enacted legislation
of some type.
At the present time, therefore, about 2,500 miles of toll highways
involving close to $3 billion of construction are in the stage of being
authorized or proposed. How many more miles of these self -liquidat-
ing facilities might be built in the United States as part of a self-
liquidating public works program? Some indication of an answer
can be obtained from a report made by the federal government.
some fifteen years ago and submitted to Congress in 1939 by the
President.2 This report was prepared by the Bureau of Public Roads
under provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938. The pur-
poseof this investigation was to determine the possibility of financ-
ing such a system of transcontinental routes through tolls.
Even at that early date the report provided substantial evidence
of the feasibility of financing highways through tolls. Conditions
since then have provided much greater support for toll finance, be-
cause motor vehicle registrations have doubled and the problem of
traffic congestion has made the motorist much more willing to pay
the high cost of the roads that are needed.
The conclusions reached by this report must be modified by the
events which have occurred since the study was made. Estimates of
the volume of traffic that would be willing to pay the toll, for exam-
ple, were based on conditions existing in the middle 1930's, when
neither consumer incomes, nor volume of traffic, nor the cost of ex-
press highways were as high as they are today. Fifteen years ago
the degree of traffic congestion and highway inadequacy had not
reached the point where the possibility of paying a toll to avoid the
inadequacies of the "free road" system offered any widespread ap-
peal. Thus the estimates of possible toll-road patronage presented
in the report were low. Average daily traffic estimated for the Penn-
sylvania Turnpike route was 715 vehicles per day compared with
11,000 vehicles per day actually using the Turnpike by 1952; toll-
paying traffic between Portland, Maine and the New Hampshire
border was estimated at 1,348 per day, while traffic now using the
Maine Turnpike averages in excess of 5,300 vehicles per day.
2 Toll Roads and Free Roads, H. Dcc. 272, 76th Cong., 1st sess.
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Table 7 shows that many sections of road that in 1939 seemed. to
offer only a moderate possibility of self-support are now accom-
modating successful toll facilities. Much of the mileage indicated as
being unable to pay its way could do so now. Although costs have
risen far above the 1939 estimates as a result of both postwar in-
TABLE 7
Self-Liquidation Possibilities for Toll Roads, 1945—1960
(as Estimated in 1939)
CUMULATEDREVENUE AS
DESCRIPTION LENGTH LENGTH PER CENT
From: To: (miles)(miles) OF COST
Jersey City, N.J. New Haven, Conn. 65.6 65.6 98.8%
Junction Route 4, Pa. Jersey City, N.J. 106.8 172.4 91.1
Route 5, Calif. Whitewater, Calif., 91.0 263.4 89.2
Washington, D.C. Baltimore, Md. 39.3 302.7 88.1
Route 2 Mass. Portland, Maine 133.9 436.6 85.1
Miami, Fla. Jacksonville, Fla. 326.5 763.1 88,2
Baltimore, Md. Route 4, Pa. 76.2 839.3 81.8
Richmond, Va. Washington, D.C. 108.3 947.6 80.5
San Ysidro, Calif. Route 6, Calif. 124.4 1,072.0 78.9
Whitewater, Calif.Indio, Calif. ' 32.7 1,104.7 78.7
Route 3, III. Route 3, Mich., md. 156.9 1,261.6 76.8
Brigham, Utah Salt Lake City, Utah 52.3 1,313.9 76.5
Odessa, Texas Route 3, Texas 837.9 1,651.8 74.8
Route 6, Calif. San Fernando, Calif. 44.8 1,696.6 73.5
Buffalo, N.Y. Albany, N.Y. 287.6 1,984.2 70:2
Route 6, Calif. Ludlow, Calif. 69.1 2,053.3 70.0
San Fernando, Calif.Tracy, Calif. 291.7 2,345.0 68.5
Minneapolis, Minn.Route 3, 111. 892.6 2,737.6 66.5
Route 4, Calif. Redding, Calif. 153.7 2,891.3 66.1
San Antonio, TexasRoute 6, Texas 250.7 2,142.0 65.1
Portland, Maine Bangor, Maine 121.3 3,263.3 74.6
St. Joseph, Mo. Route 3, Iii. 275.7 3,539.0 63.6
Route 3, III. Indianapolis, md. 203.7,3,742.7 62.9
Carlisle, Route 1, Pa. 94.8 3,837.5 62.3
Route 2, md. Detroit, Mich. 102.2 3,939.7 61.6
Tracy, Calif. Route 4, Calif. 69.1 4,008.8 61.3
Route 3, Texas Shreveport, La. 190.4 4,199.2 60.4
Ludlow, Calif. Las Vegas, Nev. 117.0 4,316.2 60.2
Fargo, N.D. Minneapolis, Minn. 219.1 4,585.3 59.7
New Haven, Conn.Route 2, Mass. 99.8 4,685.1 59.0
Creeley, Cob. St. Joseph, Mo. 529.7 5,164.8 58.0
Indianapolis, md. Columbus, Ohio 156.6 5,321.4 57.4
Phoenix, Ariz. El Paso, Texas 391.1 5,712.5 56.9
Cleveland, Ohio Buffalo, N.Y. 220.7 5,933.2 55.8
Oakland. Calif. Auburn, Calif. 110.0 6,043.2 55.3
Boise, Idaho Rupert, Idaho 182.2 6,225.4 55.0
Shreveport, La. Vicksburg, Miss. 168.8 6,894.2 54.7
(continued on next page)
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fiation and expanding highway design requirements, the tremendous
expansion of postwar traffic, the mounting congestion on existing
free roads, and the ability and willingness of consumers to pay the
bill for good roads more than offset the higher cost. It is quite pos-









Salem, Ore. Portland, Ore. 56.9 6,451.1 54.3%
Route 4, III. Route 2, Iii. 155.5 6,606.6 53.9
Perrysburg, Ohio Cleveland, Ohio 79.3 6,685.9 53.5
Route 6, S.C. Richmond, Va. 362.6 7,048.5 52.9
St. Louis, Mo. Route 4, Iii. 88.8 7,137.3 52.7
Albany, N.Y. Route 1, Mass. 147.2 7,284.5 52.0
Pittsburgh, Pa. Carlisle, Pa. 168.6 7,451.1 51.4
Tulsa, Okia. Springfield, Mo. 171.3 7,622.4 51.1
Route 3, Mich., md.Perrysburg, Ohio 69.9 7,692.3 51.0
Jacksonville, Fla. Route 6, S.C. 219.3 7,911.6 50.6
Detroit, Mich. Port Huron, Mich. 72.5 7,984.1 50.4
Springfield, Mo. St. Louis, Mo. 165.2 8,149.3 50.1
Route 4, Pa. Route 1, Mo. 88.5 9,237.8 50.0
Roseburg, Ore. Salem, Ore. 133.3 8,371.1 49.7
El Paso, Texas Odessa, Texas 245.2 8,618.3 49.3
Indio, Calif. Phoenix, Ariz. 254.0 8,870.3 49.0
Columbus, Ohio Pittsburgh, Pa. 195.0 9,065.3 48.5
Portland, Ore. Route 2, Wash. 146.7 9,212.0 47.8
Route 2, Wash. Canadian boundary 124.7 9,336.7 47.3
Route 6, Texas Tulsa, OkIa. 270.5 9,607.2 46.9
Auburn, Calif. Reno, Nev. 106.5 9,713.7 46.6
Ashland, Ore. Roseburg, Ore. 122.9 9,836.6 46.3
Las Vegas, Nev. Salt Lake City, Utah407.510,244.1 45.7
Birmingham, Ala. Atlanta, Ga. 141.210,385.3 45.5
Boardman, Ore, Boise, Idaho 253.110,638.4 45.0
Salt Lake City, UtahGreeley, Cob. 463.311,101.7 44.2.
Rupert, Idaho Brigham, Utah 119.711,221.4 44.1
Redding, Calif. Ashland, Ore. 138.211,359.6 43.7
Seattle, Wash. Ellensburg, Wash. 90.011,449.6 43.4
Vicksburg, Miss. Birmingham, Ala. 270.511,720.1 42.9
Bangor, Maine Canadian boundary 196.611,916.7 42.6
Portland, Ore. Boardman, Ore. 163.412,080.1 42.2
Mexican boundarySan Antonio, Texas 156.212,236.3 42.0
Augusta, Ca. Charleston, S.C. 116.312,352.6 41.8
Reno, Nev. Salt Lake City, Utah514.912,867.5 .41.3
Spokane, Wash. Fargo, N.D. 1,189.6 14,037.1 39.8
Ellensburg, Wash. Spokane, Wash. 145.914,183.0 39.5
Atlanta, Ca. Augusta, Ca. 153.214,336.2 39.2
Source: Toll Roads and Free Roads, H. Doe. 272, 78th Cong., 1st sess.
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liquidating might now prove fully self-supporting. This would mean
a potential toll-road system of 9,238 miles.3
Intercity routes, however, do not provide the only potential for
the toll highway. To the extent that rOads financed by tolls can be
adapted to the local short-haul requirements of urban areas there
is a substantial additional mileage of routes that might be financed
with revenue bonds and tolls. In recent years there have been a
number of demonstrations of how controlled access roads in urban
areas have been able to afford relief for downtown commuter traf-
fic. Thus far most of these expressways have been nontoll facilities,
although several have introduced toll collection at key points such
as bridges or tunnels. With the possible exception of Los Angeles,
however, there has been little in the way of a system approach to
urban expressway development.
Thus far the high cost of achieving solutions to urban transport
problems on a broad scale has postponed many highly desirable
undertakings. Costs ranging from $5millionto $10 million a mile are
common for urban expressways, and financing methods to achieve
anything worthwhile in the way of expressway systems have not
been devised. The feasibility of the toll-secured revenue bond for
urban projects has been questioned on the grounds that toll collec-
tion from large volumes of short-run rush hour traffic would impede
rather than facilitate traffic movement.
It is now apparent that one stop to pay the toll on an urban ex-
pressway interferes far less with traffic than a dozen or more stops
at traffic lights and other traffic interferences. Hollywood Boulevard,
for example, by eliminating traffic lights and cross streets is re-
putedly saving Los Angeles motorists 120 million stops a year. In
any event, there are mechanics other than cash toll collection that
can eliminate this objection to the toll road in urban areas. One is
the commuter ticket which can be purchased and displayed by
regular users of a toll system to gain entrance and exit without
stopping to pay toll. Variations of this method have been used for
some time both by the Port of New York Authority at its bridge and
tunnel entrances and on the Merritt Parkway.
A second possibility might be to issue revenue bonds for both ex-
pressway and adjacent downtown parking areas, with facilities so
designed that all traffic destined for the downtown area would
terminate in the parking areas and pay a fee at the parking lot or
Note that Pittsburgh to Carlisle, now the successful western extension of the
Pennsylvania Turnpike, is indicated in the table to be able to cover only 51 per
cent of costs.
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garage that would include both the cost of parking and the cost of
using the expressway. The revenue bonds could also include funds
for the modernization of mass transportation. Rapid transit, for ex-
ample could be provided on the same rights of way used by motor
vehicle traffic.
Along with toll highways there continue to be a large number of
expensive bridge and tunnel projects that can be self-supporting
through the charging of tolls. Some of the problems associated with
toll projects as a possible means of combating depression will be
discussed in a later section.
PARKING FACILITIES
Multi-million-dollarparkingstructuresbeing constructedor
planned in most cities throughout the country provide a new cate-
gory of private and public construction that could be promoted on
a large-scale in depression periods. Parking accommodations are
being financed by both government and private enterprise, sep-
arately and cooperatively. In most states a municipality may par-
ticipate in providing parking garages either by providing facilities
itself, by delegating the work to an authority or agency of the
government, by furnishing financial aid to private construction, or
by leasing to private operators. This whole area of public interest
and participation has developed since the war, when previous in-
difference to the problem of automobile parking became intolerable
in the face of automobile ownership trends that have doubled the
number of cars since 1985.
There are at least 33 states that permit cities or other units of
local government to borrow to finance parking. In some states the
county, metropolitan district, or a state agency is authorized to is-
sue the bonds. These must be revenue bonds in 13 states and
general-obligation bonds in 4 states, and may be either type in 16
states.
Legislative provisions with respect to the ownership or operation
of parking facilities by local units of government sometimes stipu-
late the maximum amount that may be borrowed, fix the maximum
interest rate and maturity period, and designate the kinds of reve-
nues that may be used. Life of the bonds varies from 20 to 50 years,
amounts specified may be as high as $100 million, and revenues to
be used may include general taxes, fees charged against users of
the facility, parking meter revenues, and special assessments.
Although most government action in this field is provided through
the regular channels of municipal government, there are at least
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54 parking authorities, commissions, or boards in the United States
with varying degrees of power to provide off-street parking ac-
commodations. As yet only a few have specific authority to plan
comprehensive systems of parking facilities, as is the case, for exam-
ple, in Wisconsin. About half the parking authorities have the power
of condemnation to permit the necessary land to be assembled, and'
half the authorities may issue revenue bonds, which are, however,
frequently contingent on approval of the
In addition to parking agencies, there are approximately 16. pub-
lic authorities that are authorized to provide for parking among
other responsibilities for public works. For example, in Massa-
chusetts the Metropolitan Transit Authority may provide parking
accommodations in conjunction with transit operations. Market au-
thorities in Maryland and Virginia are in a similar category; and
the Triborough Bridge and Tuimel Authority in New York City may
provide parking and other terminal accommodations in connection
with other transportation facilities.
TERMncALS
1n recent years the problems of interchange in the terminal area,
and the large number of transportation companies involved in
terminal operations, have given impetus to the provision of self-
liquidating union bus and truck terminals and terminals that combine
rail, highway, and water facilities. This in turn has led to a wider par-
ticipation in financing arrangements, and to mixed public and private
undertakings often administered by a quasi-governmental body such
as a port authority. This type of construction activity is rapidly
growing in importance both in the category of public works and as
private undertakings' that might be aided by government.
An illustrationof the magnitude of truck terminal needs is pro-
vided by measures being taken in Chicago. Seven or eight large
truck terminal areas adjacent to the expressway system have been
planned to house all trucking companies in the city. 'Necessary
ordinances were passed by the city and a new zoning classifica-
tion Was created known as Truck Terminal Districts. It is antici-
pated' that the present program will require a total investment of
$100 million.
The $24 million Port of New York Authority Bus Terminal, joined
with the Lincoln. Tunnel, is a good example of a self-supporting
on parking from David R. Levin, The Effectiveness of Parking Agencies,
Highway Research Board, 1952.
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project that is needed in many urban areas of the United States.
About 90 per cent of intercity buses and bus passengers traveling
to and from mid-Manhattan use the Terminal. was
through terminal bonds secured by the earnings of the structure
and by the Port Authority general reserve fund. The project was
designed to be fully self-supporting over the long run. The Termi-
nal includes a shopping center of over seventy consumer• services.
Concession rentals provide about 60 per cent of the Bus Terminal's
total income, and the percentage is expected to increase to 70 per
cent in the near future.
In some cities bus terminal.s are being constructed by individual
bus companies or jointly by several companies, while in other
locations municipal revenue bonds are providing the capital for
such facilities. In all cases the support for such undertakings is
largely in ancillary revenue producers that shift the financial bur-
den from direct users of the terminal to related business activity.
The number of extensive terminal plans, many of them being
undertaken with private capital, with or without public assistance,
indicates the potential for government stimulation of such if
business conditions make it necessary for private industry to post-
pone such undertakings.
In many cities the relocation of railroad terminals and yards has
provided valuable properties for the development of more appro-
priate land uses. In Philadelphia the new Penn Center made possible
by abandonment of the Pennsylvania Railroad's Broad Street Sta-
tion will provide hotel and office accommddations, parking, and Civic
buildings. In Cleveland the Pennsylvania Railroad has sold an 11-
acre terminal site in the heart of the city to make way for a $200
million development that may ultimately cover 60 acres. The land
will be used to provide a hotel, office buildings, government build-
ings, underground parking for 25,000 cars, freight sidings, and a
3-story warehouse beneath hotel and apartment buildings. In Bos-
ton, removal from the Back Bay of yards occupied by the Boston &
Albany Railroad has paved the way for comparable development of
a Boston Civic Center.
•A new deep-water terminal is under construction in Boston as part
of the Boston Port Authority's master plan of port terminal de-
velopment, and in Houston the Port Côrnmissioñ is preparing a
master plan for port development to be carried out during the next
twenty years. In San Francisco the first financing of harbor bonds
entirely on a revenue bond basis has been accomplished by issuance
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of $6 million of thirty-year obligations to construct a world trade
center and to finance pier improvements at the California-owned
port of San Francisco. Bonds will be serviced from the port's oper-
ating income.
These developments, involving very heavy capital requirements,
could be undertaken in nearly every large city. The possibilities of
government incentives to help finance such undertakings in times
of business depression may be a significant part of a so-called public
works program. Urban redevelopment planning indicates not only
that extensive self-liquidating facilities are feasible but that any
plans for public works to combat depression will need to promote
private and municipal undertakings already conceived if there is
to be not merely a shift from private to public investment and from
local to federal financing. The need appears to be one of encourag-
ing similar large-scale plans in other cities now, and of assuring
the desired stimulation of these activities later through appropriate
financial aid and incentive.
TRANSIT
Mostcities are coming to the realization that large-scale invest-
ment in new plant and equipment may be necessary to provide addi-
tional mass transportation capacity and improved service. This is
an area that is for the most part under private management, al-
though a growing number of cities have municipal transit systems or
public authorities. Whatever the present management arrangement,
however, the need for bold plans is obvious in the inadequacy, of
commutation facilities in large cities. Cooperation between private
industry and government is needed now to begin the difficult task
of outlining what needs to be done, and what could be done if the
means of providing the necessary capital were made available.
Recent transit plans and modernization projects in several cities
indicate the nature and magnitude of the task in this area. The New
York Transit Authority approved a $1 billion improvement program
• and a six-year plan that would provide for construction of a new
subway line, rehabilitation of existing facilities, extensions to the
system, and new equipment and plants. A charter amend-
ment in Cleveland cleared the way for a $22.5 million Reconstruction
Finance Corporation loan for modernization of' the Cleveland
Transit System, to be financed from -fares over a period of twenty
years. A rapid transit plan for metropolitan Boston in 1947 proposed
improvements 'which at that time, called for an estimated invest-
ment of $73 million. Expansion of the Metropolitan Transit Author-
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ity facilities will be financed by bonds of the Boston Metropolitan
District.
AIRPORTS
The dimensions of airport capital requirements and the extent
to which airports provide an opportunity for self-liquidating projects
are questions that need to be answered in present-day planning for
public works. The financing of airports has undergone substantial
change in the course of the past two decades. Prior to 1933, airport
capital expenditures were supplied 50 per cent from commercial
and private sources and nearly 48 per cent by municipal govern-
ments. Federal financing was less than 1 per cent of the total.
The rapid development of aviation in the thirties, however, com-
bined with the financial difficulties of local governments during the
depression, changed this picture. Federal participation in airport
development increased rapidly as part of the work-relief program,
and from 1933 through 1940 over 70 per cent of all airport capital
outlays were federal grants.5
After the war the Federal Airport Act of 1946 authorized• ex-
penditures of $500 million over a seven-year period, but actual ap-
propriations have been less than half this sum. When it came to
filling the gap, city voters were reluctant to approve general-
obligation bond issues for the financing of airports. As airport costs
rise with increasing length of runways and greater capacity of ter-
minal buildings, the limits to which cities are willing to go in financ-
ing airports are being rapidly approached. This reluctance has been
fortified by mounting air transport business and increasingly profit-
able air operations.
A picture of the possibilities of airport self-support under these cir-
cumstances is provided by the Port of New York Authority's experi-
ence. City, state, and federal agencies had invested $121 million in
New York International, La Guardia, and Newark Airports before the
Port Authority assumed responsibility for them in 1947. By the end of
1953 the Port Authority had spent or committed an additional $98 mil-
lion, inaluding expenditures at Teterboro Airport, which it pur-
chased in 1949. Except for federal grants of $4.1 million, financing
has been accomplished by the Authority through air terminal bonds.
Gross operating revenues for the four Port Authority airports in
1953 reached a high of $9.5 million, and net operating revenues
before debt service totaled $1.5 million. After deducting interest
5Throughthe Civil Works Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, and the Work Projects Administration.
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charges of $2.0 million on air terminal bonds, the net deficit in
was$500,562, which was paid out of the general reserve fund.6 This
degree of airport self-support was achieved in the heaviest air traf-
fic center in the United States, and has been made possible by a
comprehensive regional development of public works which taken
as a whole isself-supporting. The problems of achieving self-
supporting air terminals in other cities with less traffic and no re-
gional. plan of financing are obviously great.
There are now about 6,000 airports in the United States. Most of
them are small airports for private flying, which do not offer oppor-
tunities for large-scale construction projects. But they can be made
largely self-supporting through agricultural pursuits on unused air-
port acreage. At the other end of the scale are some 734 major civil
airports designed for commercial flights that could use consider-
able large-scale construction but have doubtful possibilities for
self-support. However, with the development of concession reve-
nues at major airports, a very significant trend toward self-support
is indicated, and with airline gross revenues already exceeding $1.5
billion annually the outlook both for expanding facility require-
ments and for increasing self-support is promising.
Total expenditures for airports in recent postwar years, includ-
ing capital and maintenance outlays,. have averaged only about $80
million. This sum includes private facilities, municipal airports, and
airports operated by state governments and authorities. Municipal
airports in the 41 largest cities of the United States accounted for
$37 million of expenditures in 1952, of which $29.3 million was for
capital outlay. Of 1,819 airports under direct control of municipal
or county governments, only 614 were showing a surplus of reve-
nues over operating expenditures (Table 8).
TABLE 8
Airports under Municipal or County Covernments, 1952









Source: Civil Aeronautics Administration. Review includes Regions 1 to 7.
6AnnualReport, Port of New York Authority, 1953.
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With mounting air cargocarriageand continued expansion of
passenger traffic, the demand for major terminals continues to
mount, but rapidly changing technology makes it difficult to fore-
see at this time what the location, and design of future air-
ports should be. The helicopter and the convertiplane, along with
the advent of jet power, have the airport plannersa difficult posi-
tion. In any event the future capital requirements for United States
airports as estimated by the Civil Aeronautics Administration in its
1952 National Airport Plan include 2,232 new airports and im-
provements at 2,583 existing airports. Cost of the program was
mated at $650 million.
Much more needs to be learned about the prospects for self-
liquidating or partially self-liquidating public works in this area,
looking to the probable growth of air passenger and cargo opera-
tions and changes in technology that can be anticipated in the years
immediately ahead.
2. Obstacles to Self-Liquidating Public Works Program
From the standpoint of potential construction and employment,
it is helpful that the principal opportunities for a program to com-
bat depression are in the cities and their suburbs, where 100 mil-
lion people live and where much of our• economic activity is con-
centrated. These metropolitan areas present the most urgent need
for public works as a result of the past two decades of their growth,
and they therefore offer the greatest opportunities for new invest-
ment in community facilities.
But along with the advantages of public works activity in urban-
ized areas, the task of actually planning and agreeing on what is
to be done is particularly formidable. The difficulties of undertaking
large-scale public works arise from the inflexibility of the established
urban pattern, the absence of space in which to provide new facili-
ties of adequate capacity, and the absence of governmental machin-
ery to plan and carry out needed solutions.
Thus far only superficial efforts have been made to solve the
problems of urban blight. Much of the activity now under way
treats the symptoms of urban congestion rather than its causes.
Generally this activity represents far too small an effort in relation
to the magnitude of the problem. A basió question, therefore, is
how a public works program to combat depression should be de-
signed so that at the same time it can combat the problems of our
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urban society, and not multiply them. In using the device of large-
scale public works as a tool for economic stabilization we could be
creating long-run economic problems of even greater consequence
by making erroneous decisions with respect to location, type, and
conception of the public works we undertake. Conversely, the op-
portunity for real accomplishment is equally clear.
One example of the problem of determining a desirable program
of public improvements is provided by the arguments now being
carried on in almost every large city over whether construction
activities should be permitted to encourage more densely popu-
lated urban areas or whether they should promote a more rapid
decentralization or dispersal of urban concentrations to other loca-
tions. These arguments need to be resolved in every community,
and whatever agreement can be reached must take the form of an
acceptable regional plan to provide the framework into which a
public works program could be fitted.
Public works programs for anticyclical purposes may be vitiated
by such obstacles as the absence of detailed plans and failure to
acquire the necessary land in advance. In the case of self-liquidating
public works these obstacles are magnified by the fact that such
undertakings are generallyof considerable magnitude and cost and as
such involve difficult problems of land acquisition, planning, and
financing. Moreover, conflicting views among city planners as to
what the city of the future should be like create substantial barriers
to agreement.
The additional problems of self-liquidating public works are es-
pecially striking in the case .of toll highways. Among them are the
absence of agreement concerning self-liquidation as an objective,
the absence of techniques for achieving self-support, the problem
that arises from the threat of competition from parallel "free"
roads, the absence in many states of adequate enabling legislation,
and the absence of federal policy that recognizes and helps to over-
come some of the problems of using public works as a tool to com-
bat depression.
DESIRABILITY OF SELF-SUPPORT
Attitudes about the question of self-liquidation vs. general-fund
financing are in many respects of key importance to the develop-
ment and acceptance of a program of self-liquidating public works.
There is a basic conflict in the transportation field, for example, with
respect to the question of how facilities should be paid for; One
point of view holds that since nearly everybody uses the streets and
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highways and everyone benefits from a good transit system, the total
bill should be paid through general taxes. A contrary view is that
the provision of transportation services is more in the nature of a
public business enterprise and as such should be considered apart
from the general functions of government and paid for directly by
those who use the services. Between these extremes are numerous
positions that combine self-support and general tax support, and
these are reflected in the situation today.
The case of the New York subway deficit provides a current
illustration that the conflict at the community level between those
-whofavor self-support and those who argue for general tax support
is not academic.7 According to one view of the recent $50million
annual subway operating deficit (which was in addition to general
tax support of the existing subway debt structure) the desirable
course would have been to maintain the fare at 10 cents, and to
make up the deficit through a tax on the profits of business "which
prospers because buses and subways, feed commerce right to their
doors." Such a plan would assure that "all who benefit from the
transit system contribute to its upkeep." 8Theopposite view, that
mounting subway deficits had become an intolerable threat to the
entire fiscal position of the city government, won a partial victory in
that users now are required to pay more in accordance with the
rising cost of providing service. But the decision to move toward
a higher degree of self-support for New York's subways was not
made overnight, and other communities in which self-liquidating
public works might be undertaken may be equally reluctant to ac-
cept the view that self-liquidation is a desirable characteristic for
a program of public works. Especially is this likely to be the case
in periods of depression.
METHODS OF PAYING THE BILL
Even where the attempt is made to provide self-supporting trans-
portation facilities, there are sharp differences of opinion as to de-
sirable financing methods. In New York, for example, the Port of
New York Authority confines its activities to those which are self-
liquidating or which have a reasonable chance of ultimate self-
support. But the Port Authority concept is that transportation facili-
ties in the New York region should be financed not as separate
projects but as parts of the whole port development system, which
Anotherillustration may be found in the battle that still goes on between
toll-road and anti-toll-road philosophers.
8NewYork Times, March 27, 1953, p. 18.
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taken together must be self-supporting. Thus the Authority's six
bridges and tunnels provided much of the revenue needed to sup-
port eleven other enterprises operating at a loss in 1953, including
airports, grain terminals, and bus and truck terminals.
There has been widespread objection, however, to this system
type of development on the grounds that it is unfair, for example,
to require motor vehicle users to defray the deficit incurred at the
Authority'sairports.Supporters ofthis view argue thattoll-
supported facilities should be accomplished on an individual project
basis rather than in accordance with a regional system of develop-
ment. The same issues have arisen with respect to toll roads and
are implicit in questions of extending transit operations to un-
profitable suburban areas.
Perhaps one reason why self-supporting public facilities are in
the minority lies in the absence of any rational plan for establish-
ing charges to be paid by consumers. Existing charges often have
little relation to the cost of providing needed services and often
have no relation to possibilities of influencing the volume and char-
acter. of the demand for services.
To illustrate, on most transit lines the passenger who boards at
the beginning of the line and sits pays the same fare as the rider
in the downtown area who travels only a few blocks and And
passengers in rush hours pay no more than those who ride in off-
peak hours. In many cases they. pay less. The gasoline tax is also a
poor pricing mechanism since it is collected at a uniform rate
throughout the state, regardless of the cost of providing the specific
facility being used. Thus a vehicle may be• traveling on an urban
expressway costing 1 cent per vehicle-mile to provide, or on a less
costly highway at .1 cent per vehicle-mile.
The inadequacies of transportation pricing policies raise the ques-
tion whether sufficient emphasis has been given to cost considera-
tions and the pricing mechanism as a means of accomplishing trãns-
portation objectives. Fares, tolls, fees, and other charges for public
services frequently lack any rational scientific basis, unlike, for ex-
ample, electric power or telephone rates, which involve many simi-
lar problems. It is likely that more attention directed to pricing in
the field of potentially self-liquidating public works will reveal im-
portant possibilities for self-support.
FBEEROADCOMPETITION
The closest we have come to experiencing what might happen
to toll-road patronage under depression conditions was under the
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restrictions on motor vehicle use imposed by the war. During World
War II, traffic on our only important toll highway, the Pennsylvania
Turnpike, dropped to 8,000 vehicles per day. Revenues during the
three fiscal years 1948 to 1945 failed by $1.4 million to cover the
combined requirements for interest and maintenance. The Penn-
sylvania General Assembly in 1945 prepared to meet the situation
by authorizing the Turnpike to issue revenue bonds for war emer-
gency financing of interest and sinking fund requirements. How-
ever, with the end of the war, the end of gasoline rationing, and the
resumption of automobile production, a rapid increase in Turnpike
traffic removed any necessity for emergency measures.
The problem of building new toll roads during depression is
closely related to this experience. First, it is possible that existing
toll roads might suffer considerable loss of traffic during a. pro-
longed depression wherever the use of alternate "free" roads would
seem to be worth the saving of the toll. This problem, it will be
noted, does not apply to most toll bridges, which generally exer-
cise a monopoly either because there is no other nearby way across
or because all local crossings are under the same management. But
in the case of the New Jersey Turnpike, for example, a considerable
volume of traffic might shift to toll-free U.S. Route 1 in order to
avoid the extra out-of-pocket costs of as much as $1.75 per pas-
senger car on the toll road, despite the fact that hidden costs on the
old road, in time lost and higher operating costs, might more than
offset saving the toll.
The point is simply that public reaction to the building of new
toll roads might be unfavorable at a time when objection to exist-
ing toll facilities was mounting. This possibility, however, depends
on a number of factors, including the extent to which motorists by
that time have accepted the toll as part of the cost of highway
transportation. But there is the additional possibility that toll au-
thorities in a depression might adjust rates to reduce the competi-
tive pull of alternative "free" routes. In any event, if the depression
of the 1930's is any guide, no conceivable magnitude of economic
adversity will reduce motor traffic in populous areas to the point
where it could be accommodated by the free road system alone (see
Table 9).
STATh ENABLING LEGISLATION
To finance a highway with revenue bonds and collect tolls re-
quires legislation. In most of the twenty-three states with this
power the legislative battle has been lengthy and the resulting
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Effect of Economic Conditions on Motor Vehicle Registrations, Production, and
Traffic, 1929—1940
(index numbers; 1929 =100.)



























































1940 120.8 84.9 152.8 233.7
Source: Based on Highway Statistics Summary, Bureau of Public Roads, to
1945, and Automobile Facts and Figures, 1953.
legislation has often been restricted to specific roads rather than
providing broad authority .(Table10). If a program of toll highway
construction were considered necessary in the near future as part of a
program to combat depression, it would, be found that half the states
are without. authority to build such roads and many of those that
do have authority either have already used it to build the roads
specified in the legislation or need new legislation to specify addi-
tional routes. Those that do not have authority would not be able
to get it very quickly, if past experience is any guide.
Such past experience illustrates the time problem and the need
for obtaining necessary enabling acts now (Table 11). The initial
toll-road undertaking was inspired by the possibilities of creating
employment in Pennsylvania during the depression. A resolution
requesting investigation of the feasibility of such a project was in-
troduced in the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1935, and a commission
comprising members of the House and Senate was created for this
purpose. Through the efforts of the Highway Department a grant
was obtained from the Works Progress Administration to make a
preliminary survey of the route, and on the basis of this survey the
commission reported favorably on the toll-road project. Legislation
was passed in 1937 establishing the Pennsylvania Turnpike Corn-
mission.° Construction started in November 1938, and on October
°PublicLaw 774, 1937.
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(X) States Having Authority to Construct Toll Roads
Alabama X Nebraska
Arizona Nevada
Arkansas X New Hampshire
California X New Jersey
X Colorado New Mexico
XConnecticut X New York
Delaware X North Carolina
XFlorida North Dakota






X Kentucky South Dakota
Louisiana Tennessee





















































Eastern ext. • May 1940 Sept. 1948Nov. 1950 26


























(22miles in 6 years)
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1, 1940 the original Turnpike, 160 miles in length, was opened to
trafflc.
Legislation that mentions specific routes or points that the au-
thorized turnpike shall connect limits the authority of toll-road
commissions in many states. In Maine, for example, the road was to
be built "at such location as shall be approved by the State High-
way Commission from a point at or near Kittery. in York County to
a point at or near Fort Kent in Aroostock County." In some states
general authority to construct toll roads has to be implemented
by further legislation designating specific routes. This is true, for
example, of New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.
In other legislation full authorization to designate turnpike routes
is granted the turnpike or highway agency. The Indiana Toll Road
Commission may construct toll projects at the locations it selects
provided the routes are approved by the governor. The Colorado
Highway Department, which is responsible for toll-road work, is
authorized to adopt "a master plan for the development and im-
provement of the State I-Iighway System by the construction of turn-
pikes...." InOhio the Turnpike Commission is empowered "to
designate the locations" of the turnpike projects, but with the stipu-
lation that the locations selected be considered necessary or desir-
able by the director of highways.
Financing provisions contained in toll-highway laws generally
specify that revenue bonds shall be issued and secured by tolls and
other revenues collected specifically from the projects constructed,
without pledging the faith and credit of the state. In some states,
such as New Hampshire and New York, however, the credit of the
•state is pledged. .
Insome cases toll-road legislation specifies the maximum amount.
that may be borrowed. Specific sums may be appropriated for ad-
vance planning, but generally it is provided that the turnpike com-
mission may borrow from the highway department for planning
and engineering services in advance of the sale of bonds. Other
stipulations. in toU-road legislation include permission to accept
gifts of land and money, and in particular to accept aid from the
federal government. .•..
POSITIONOF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The current position and past, attitudes of the federal govern-
ment on the question of toll roads are important in any considera-
lionplans for an extensive system of self-liquidating highway
facilities financed with revenue bonds.
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In the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916, the secretary of agricul-
ture was authorized to cooperate with the states in. th.e construction
of rural post roads, provided "that all roads constructed under the
provisions of this act shall be free from tolls of all kinds." 10This
prohibition against the imposition of tolls on roads constructed with
federal aid was restated in the Federal Highway Act of 1921, and
the prohibition still stands.'1
Departure from this policy in the case of bridges, however, oc-
curred in legislation passed in 1927. This law provided that the
secretary of agriculture might extend federal aid to any state or
its political subdivisions for the construction of any toll bridge
and approaches, provided that such bridge was owned and operated
by a state or its subdivision.
The works financing bill of designed to provide employment
through self-liquidating improvement programs, set the stage for
a program of self-liquidating public works, but it failed to pass. The
self-liquidating projects proposed by this legislation were to be
carried out through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and
were to include projects undertaken by the Department of Agri-
culture, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Public Works Administra-
tion, and the Rural Electrification Administration.12 The bill pro-
vided that the Bureau of Public Roads should have the power, with
the approval of the RFC, to fix, maintain, and collect tolls and other
charges for the use of highway improvements.. Revenues derived
from such collections in excess of what was needed to operate and
maintain the improvement could be used for further highway
projects.
In addition, the works financing bill prwided for the acquisition
of land to be held as an investment by the government to permit
the recoupment of values resulting from highway improvements.
The Bureau of Public Roads was to have the power "...toac-
quire by purchase, but not by condemnation, for investment pur-
poses, any real property in the vicinity of any highway. improve-
ments or Federal-aid construction....."
Intestifying in favor of this legislation, the commissioner of pub-
lie roads pointed out that the bill provided for improvement in
four categories: "...First.Bridges and tunnels and similar mdi-
vidual projects on direct toll basis. Second. Very limited mileage
of toll roads, including excess taking of land. Third. Land acquisi-
tion for rights-of-way, particularly, at the outset in metropolitan
1039 Stat. 355, sec.1. 42 Stat. 212, sec. 9.
12 S. 2759, 76th Cong., 1st sess.
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areas and connecting such areas. Fourth. Express highways in
metropolitan areas. These are all, essential parts of an adequate and
truly national master plan for highway development."The com-
missioner pointed out that aside from the limited possibilities of
providing fully self-liquidating toll projects, financing on other
routes might be accomplished through a combination of tolls, ex-
cess land takings and resale of some of those lands, and income
from the gas tax and motor vehicle license fees.
In 1948 a bill was introduced in the House which would have
extended provisions of the 1927 legislation to federal grants for
highways.'4 This bill proposed also that the federal aid apportion-
ment to a state might be expended not only by the state or any
political subdivision, but by any agency or instrumentality of the
state, or any instrumentality created by an agreement between two
or more states. Thus the bill would have permitted toll roads to
be constructed which might not otherwise be capable of self-
support, with federal aid furnishing the type of assistance rendered
through the Public Works Administration for the Pennsylvania
Turnpike.
For a number of years prior to the war, interest in the possibility
of constructing transcontinental toll highways was indicated by the
introduction of bills for this purpose in Congress. These proposals
culminated in a meeting in Atlantic City during 1941, to discuss
transcontinental toll superhighways, costing between $50 and 100
billion. The chairman of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission
was among those sponsoring the plan which was offered primarily
with the idea of providing useful public works in the postwar
period. It was stated that the proposed highway system could be
paid for out of revenue bonds, with the federal government guar-
anteeing the interest.
Since the war a number of similar proposals have been submitted
to congress. In 1946 a bill was introduced to authorize a $12 bil-
lion system of highways financed through tolls.15 In 1950 a bill was
introduced for establishing the Crozet Transcontinental Superhigh-
way Commission to construct and operate a coast-to-coast highway,
using wherever practicable such free roads and toll roads as were
already built or under construction.'6 This bill prdvided that the
Bureau of Public Roads should supervise the construction and
Statementof Thomas H. MacDonald, commissioner of public roads, Works
Financing Act of 1939, Hearings before theSenateCommittee on Banking and
Currency, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, p. 51.
6527, 80th Cong., 2nd sess. H.R.50, 79th Cong., 2nd sess.
16H.R.7578, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.
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operation of any section of the highway "where the State...does
not have proper toll-road laws or will not construct, maintain, and
operate such a through super-highway within its borders." Wher-
ever the Commission found it necessary to build sections of the
road, it could issue revenue bonds secured by anticipated toll col-
lections, "Without recourse against the Federal Government." No
federal funds would be spent on the project "except in the form of
direct grants to offset the benefit to the national defense."
3. Concluding Views
The foregoing discussion has indicated that, with the expansion
of the American economy, a large backlog of needed public works
has accumulated and that a considerable proportion of it is made up
of either fully or partially self-liquidating projects. To the extent
that public works are a useful tool to combat depression, a great
volume of important needs could be met through a large-scale
construction effort. In addition, many activities now under way or
planned by private enterprise which might otherwise be postponed
in a depression could be aided by government as part of the over-
all program to stimulate construction.
Many of the most urgent needs and most promising possibilities
for self-liquidating facilities are in urban areas, where most of
our population and economic activity are located. This advantage
may be outweighed, however, by the intricacies of urban planning
with which any public works program must cope. In the city, de-
cisions as to location and type of facilities may have important
impacts on the whole urban structure, and they must be carefully
considered if public works are to contribute to the ultimate goals
of the community. In many metropolitan areas the administra-
tive machinery required to arrive at intergovernmental decisions
does not exist, and communities continue to be hampered in their
efforts to plan a program of public works because the problem they
face goes far beyond the outmoded political boundaries of govern-
ment control and taxing power. The importance of developing ade-
quate administration, in port authorities, regional commissions, or
other forms, is accordingly great; and the coordinating functions of
the federal government should be recognized and developed.
When large self-liquidating public undertakings are under con-
sideration, many of the problems associated with public works in
general are compounded: the tasks of advance planning, of plan-
ning on a comprehensive scale, of developing the necessary ad-
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ministrative machinery, and of acquiring the necessary land. Fur-
ther obstacles are imposed by opposition to self-liquidation as a
principle and to toll collection as a method; the absence of accepted
pricing policies for public service introduces added difficulty. To
wait until the need for an accelerated program of public works is
upon us would, under these circumstances, result in confusion and
frustration and certainly find us without the plans and procedures
that would make possible the kind of facilities we really need.
To avoid such a situation, intelligent mobilization of efforts is re-
quired now. Otherwise our efforts in time of need not only might
fall short of combating depression but might fail at the same time to
take advantage of the opportunities afforded by a full-scale pub-
lic works program.
A number of public works have been singled out as offering the
dual possibility of providing worthwhile construction activity and
effective attack on long-range urban develOpment problems. Some
10,000 miles of toll highways might be feasible, together with ex-
tensive systems of urban toll highways. Substantial needs are
emerging for truck, bus, and rail terminals; airports; transit facili-
ties; parking garages; and related facilities. The additional needs of
water, sewerage, and other community facilities not examined in
this report would provide a large reservoir of necessary undertak-
ings. Many now being carried on or planned by enter-
prise, and by private and public enterprise combined, offer a sig-
nificant area of activity to be promoted, by public action. What can
be done now to prepare for such a program? Can we match the
efforts we would make to combat a depression with preparations
now to assure the accomplishment of a worthwhile public works
strategy?
Legislative obstacles to a program of self-liquidating public works
at federal, state, and local levels include the following: absence of
state and local enabling legislation for tax anticipation or revenue
bond financing, limitations in existing toll-road laws, public opposi-
tion to tolls and self-supporting facilities, absence of detailed plans,
failure to acquire land in advance, inadequacy of administrative
tools, and the like.
The greatest obstacles, however, are financial, and in this area,
while the limited-obligation bond, the revenue bond, and the ex-
pansion of toll facilities and self-supporting terminals provide a
large potential volume of projects, there would still be a need for
the federal government to assure that the capital required would
be forthcoming under adverse economic conditions. This would
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have to be accomplished either through grants of federal aid to as-
sure the financial success of partially self-liquidating facilities, or
through guarantees that would induce investors to provide the neces-
sary capital at a time when the returns from self-supporting projects
would be less than usual.'
Both government and private industry are spending billions of
dollars annually for scientific research, but little is being directed
to research to develop the administrative, legal, and financial tools
that have lagged so far behind. The federal government could take
the lead in supporting research of this kind. Although American uni-
versities have been called upon by the federal government to carry
on scientific study in the interest of developing military power,
there has been no comparable program for mobilization on the eco-
nomic front.
It may be anticipated that highway construction will not fall
off during a depression as rapidly as many other construction activi-
ties because of the relative stability of highway-user revenues, which
provide the major part of highway support. Moreover, highway and
other transportation construction has been at peak levels during the
height of prosperity, so that further expansion to provide an anti-
cyclical effect will be the more difficult. Since the major declines
may occur in such construction activities as housing, an outlet for
housing materials and labor might be found in the construction of
terminals, garages, and urban redevelopment projects rather than
highways.
But the most effective program to compensate for declining home
construction might be found in the kinds of public works that are
not self-liquidating—libraries,schools,recreationfacilities,and
similar public facilities—as well as in private undertakings of a com-
parable nature. The latter are important to the total program if an
increase in government construction is not merely to provide an off-
set for declines in private construction.
In conclusion, if the problem of promoting a self-liquidating pub-
lic works program on a large scale should arise, it is unlikely that
present efforts at public works planning would find us ready with
the comprehensive projects that are needed, or with the financial
tools that would make them possible. If, on the other hand, it were
possible to prepare now in bold terms for the kinds of facilities and
financial aids that are needed, a public works program of tremen-
dous significance could be in readiness that might have important
antidepression effects as well as extraordinary long-run economic
benefits.
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C 0 M M E N T
SIDNEY C. TIcIT0N, The Seventh Company, Inc., New York City
Owen's paper has outlined the kinds of public works that might
be undertaken to provide employment during a depression. His
concentration on the construction of public roads and urban re-
development permits me to eliminate from this discussion some,
types of public works that involve problems that are even more
controversial in their philosophical and political background—such
projects, for example, as the St. Lawrence Waterway and the Mis-
souri River Basin Development program.
A point of considerable importance with respect to the construc-
tion of public works by state and local governments during a sharp
depression concerns financing. Owen touches on this lightly.I
should like to comment on the matter at a little greater length be-
cause the financing problem can make all the difference between
getting a program started quickly—and thus allowing it to become
useful for consideration as an antidepression project—and not get-
ting it started at all, or doing it too slowly to be effective.
The long lapse of time since 1930—1933 and the high volume of
economic activity in this country have obscured the facts with re-
spect to the financial position of state and local governments dur-
ing a sharp depression, particularly the fact that under adverse eco-
nomic circumstances state and local governments are in no posi-
tion to finance large-scale public works projects. Many of them, in-
cluding some of the largest cities, and states, were in default on their
current obligations for the salaries of teachers, policemen, firemen,
and other municipal employees. They were far behind in paying
the bills of their trade suppliers. Some were postponing their lia-
bility on their short-term notes; others were defaulting on long-
term bonds. A large proportion were running substantial deficits
and were borrowing heavily in anticipation of the following year's
taxes. As a result, the credit of many state and local government
units was impaired and their ability to borrow for new programs
of public works greatly curtailed.
This unfavorable financial position in the case of many cities
and towns came about more as a result of delinquent tax collections
than as a result of increased expenditures for relief. Cities and towns
depended heavily then—as they do now—on the tax on real property
for their current revenues. During the last depression—and the
situation is not likely to change very much if there should be an-
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other—millions of property owners throughout the country failed
to pay their real estate taxes on time. In many cases, collections
of the real property tax at the end of the fiscal year amounted to
only 50 or 60 per cent of the levy—as against a normal rate of 95
per cent. The tax sale laws in many states allow a relatively long
waiting period before a city or town can offer for tax sale those
properties on which taxes have not been paid. Accordingly, in the
first or second year after tax default, cities and towns experiencing
large delinquencies can do very little about collecting the amounts
due from taxpayers.
To complicate the situation even further, the tax collection laws
on the statute books are frequently relaxed in times of economic
stress. The pressure comes from two sides: First, there are the small
taxpayers in distress who are unemployed or only partly employed.
They are politically powerful and are apt to put considerable pres-
sure on the local administrations to prevent an aggressive tax col-
lection policy. Second, there are the large taxpayers who own hotels,
apartment houses, office buildings, etc., who frequently are the
leading citizens of the state, are influential in policy determination,
and account for a large part of the dollar volume of delinquent taxes
outstanding. This was the case in Detroit in 1932 when I prepared
a study of the subject for the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Re-
search.' Forty or fifty leading taxpayers together were responsible
for about 25percent of the aggregate tax delinquency because of
the high assessed valuation, in proportion to the total, carried by the
multi-story office buildings, the big hotels, and the large apartment
developments, most of which were partly vacant and many of which
were in receivership during this period.
In such a situation the existing units of state and local govern-
ment are in no position to undertake large-scale public works. It is
not a question of how desirable such works might be from an eco-
nomic point of view, or how necessary to the well-being and eco-
nomical future operation of the unit of government. It makes no
difference either that construction costs would be relatively low.
The existing units of state and local government just cannot, them-
selves, undertake the job financially, and their banking advisers are
likely to suggest a delay in capital expenditures until the current
stringency passes.
It is in such circumstances that new public bodies such as au-
thorities which have no past history of financial difficulty and no
1AnAnalysis of Tax Delinquency, Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research,
Report 128, June 30, 1932.
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portfolio of defaulted real estate taxes can fit into the picture. They
would make it possible to finance the type of public works that
Owen has in mind. It would not have been enough for a city or
county, for example, to plan to build a toll road in 1932, financed
from revenues gained from users of that road. The city's or county's
credit might well have been too badly impaired. A brand new road
authority, however, having exclusive jurisdiction over the road and
complete control of its revenues wOuld have been in a somewhat
better position to undertake the project.
This was the case in 1932 in New York. Robert Moses wanted to
build a toll road to Jones Beach; the project would provide employ-
ment and would be self-liquidating. But he needed a device that
would make it a certainty that the tolls would not be diverted to
other purposes. To meet the situation his lawyers drafted legisla-
tion for th.e Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, and this became
the first of what was to be a series of authorities for road construc-
tion throughout the country. The Parkway Authority was patterned
after the Port of New York Authority, which had been in existence
as an interstate operation for ten years. But the Parkway Authority
was more restricted in its powers.
The self-financing authorities that have been set up charge fees,
rentals, service charges, etc., for the use of their facilities in order
to provide funds sufficient to pay for the cost of acquiring and oper-
ating properties over a period of years without levying a general
assessment on the taxpayers in the vicinity of the project. In the
postwar period the operation and financing of self-liquidating proj-
ects on a pay-as-you-go basis by self-financing authorities outside of
the regular state and local government budgets are becoming one
of the new cornerstones of state and local finance.
Few people recognize the extent and scope of self-financing au-
thorities at the present time and the flexibility of their use under a
wide variety of circumstances. Their flexibility and adaptability is
what makes them useful during a depression period. They can be
tied in to the federal government through contracts and guarantees;
as in the case of the local public housing authorities now operating
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Public Housing Authority Act.
They can construct office buildings and lease them to governmental
units under a wide variety of circumstances; a recent case in Detroit
involving the construction of a building for the use of the city and
county jointly is a good illustration. They can be used to construct
school buildings, as is being done extensively in Pennsylvania and
Georgia at the present time. They can be used to construct office
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buildings, parking lots, airports, markets, sewer and water systems,
and other public works under ciréumstances in which the govern-
mental unit itself may be relatively impotent.
I bring these matters to your attention primarily because the
mechanics of "how you go about doing it" in a depression are even
more important than "being a goood idea." State and local public
works can bog down indefinitely on the question of financing. The
mechanics I have described could well be used to surmount what
might otherwise become an impossible situation.
WESLEY Irving Trust Company
I would like, to comment briefly on the problems of financing an
expanded program of public works by state and local governments,
particularly in view of the wide variation in the financial status of
these governments. There are of course a large number of different
units issuing securities, and the market ratings vary considerably.
Some small issuers have trouble finding a market even though their
basic financial position is satisfactory. It may be that an expanded
volume of public works would require an improved method of ap-
proach to the marketing of these securities. Some pooling arrange-
ment by which a number of small issues of a similar quality could
be combined into one large offering to improve, marketability might
help considerably. It is hard to say exactly how this could be done
but municipal bond men might be able to offer some suggestions.
The pooling of local public housing issues recently into various
grades may provide some ideas. Although these securities have a
virtual guarantee by the federal government, the issues have been
grouped into several classifications to improve marketability. It is
obvious that the difficulties of pooling other types of issues would
be great, but the problem of financing an expanded program of
state and local public works may well be so serious that new market-
ing methods will be needed.
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